RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (BR)

Sofia

Dated January 14, 1940

FROM

Received 10:45 p. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

2, January 14, 3 p. m.

The Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office, who made a two days official visit in Sofia en route from London and Paris, returned to Ankara last night and a joint communique was not issued. After the usual reference to the unanimity of views and cordial friendship, the communique refers to the withdrawal of troops from the frontier (see telegram No. 791, November 11) and takes cognizance of "the firm resolution of the Turkish Government to respect the neutrality of Bulgaria and the determination of the Bulgarian Government to see that that neutrality is strictly observed".

I assume this visit was made at British instigation in continuation of Great Britain's recent diplomatic activity looking towards a detente in Turko-Bulgarian relations. This activity began with the withdrawal of troops and is a direct consequence of the reappearance of Russia in Balkan politics.

The

767.74/92

JAN 18 1940

The visit gave the Prime Minister an opportunity to emphasize Bulgaria's policies of neutrality and following on the heels of the Bulgarian-Russian commercial treaty tends to counterbalance the effect of the latter. It is therefore in line with the Prime Minister's policy of equalizing the influence of the great powers in this area (despatch 362, November 21, page 4) and at the same time improving relations with Turkey; previous efforts having proved unsuccessful (despatch No. 253, May 19, page 2).

These Bulgarian tactics of using the balance of power among the great nations as a field in which to maneuver is discussed in my despatch 358, November 4, and 370, December 6.

Though I have as yet been unable to obtain any official information I doubt if the Turkish Secretary General endeavored to obtain any concrete political commitments susceptible of jeopardizing Bulgaria's neutrality and I believe that if he did make any soundings he was not successful.

I shall try to see the Prime Minister at the earliest opportunity.

Repeated to Ankara.

ROW MILLARD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM Sofia

Dated January 18, 1940

Rec'd 9:50 a. m. 19th





Secretary of State,

Washington.

5, January 18, noon. (SECTION ONE).

767.74/92

CONFIDENTIAL. My telegram 2, January 14.

I called on the Prime Minister. Referring to the visit of the Secretary General the Turkish Foreign Office he said that he explained that Bulgaria could not join the Balkan Entente or a neutral bloc. Today Bulgaria was not menaced; should she join such a group she would be. The Prime Minister informed me in answer to my inquiry that the Secretary General had not broached the subject and made no mention of Bulgaria's adherence to any such pact and that he seemed fully to understand this country's attitude. The Prime Minister said his conversation with his Turkish colleague was therefore confined to Turco-Bulgarian relations. Mr. Kiosseivanoff reasserted his country's determination to remain neutral and assured Mr. Menemen Joglu that Bulgaria would not be used as a base for an attack on the Straits. They agreed that while

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767.74/93 SECTION ONE

FILED JAN 25 1940

while relations between the two countries should remain on the friendliest basis each country would pursue its own policy quite independently of the other.

Answering a specific question the Prime Minister said that the Secretary General had not endeavored to obtain any political commitments from Bulgaria.

The Prime Minister stated that in his opinion the exchange of views with the Secretary General and the subsequent publication of the communique referred to in my telegram mentioned above had done much to allay any fears in Bulgaria as to Turkey's intentions as well as to reassure the Turks that Bulgaria would not become a springboard for an attack on the Straits by Russia or Germany.

I asked what he thought of the war in Finland and he said that it should not be overlooked that it was unpopular in Russia; both the officers and troops questioned the wisdom of the undertaking which in turn has affected their combative spirit. He said that Russia, a cold country, had for centuries looked towards the south and had always fought well in southern campaigns; a military venture in this direction would he thought be a different matter.

760d.61

Asked whether he still thought the Rumanians would not fight should Russia invade Bessarabia he declared that despite King Carol's recent speech which he thought

a mistake he continued to doubt if the Rumanians would put up a real fight. He referred to the widespread corruption in Rumania and implied that means other than purely military methods might also be effective. Furthermore he did not think Rumania would receive any help.

Asked what advice Rumania had received he replied that the French had advised her not to resist. He believed Great Britain also would prefer that Bessarabia be given up without a fight and he mentioned that the Turkish Foreign Minister had intimated to a "Foreign Minister in Ankara" that Bucharest had been given to understand that the peaceful surrender of the province would be the wisest course. The Prime Minister stated that in any event Rumania would lose that territory to Russia at a peace conference.

In reply to further questions he declared that he believed that neither Germany nor Italy would intervene unless Russia went beyond the Prut and that Russia was aware of this. (END OF SECTION ONE).

MILLARD

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

FROM

Sofia

Dated January 18, 1940

Rec'd 12:26 p. m., 19th





Secretary of State,

Washington.

5, January 18, noon (SECTION TWO)

When I referred to the possibility of Russia invading Rumania proper he said he was confident that in such event Germany would also invade the country. Asked whether he thought Rumania might invite Germany to invade the country in case she were exposed to the danger of a Russian invasion beyond the Prut he replied emphatically that if he were in Rumania's place he would not hesitate to do that as the lesser of two evils. He said Rumania had once been overrun by Germany and still survived as an independent nation. It was not the Russian army which was the danger; it was the communism they would leave behind.

In reply to a question he said he did not think the allies wanted to come to grips with Russia; that their heterogeneous army in Syria was not much of a fighting force and that as "protectors of the small neutral nations" the

767.74/93 SECTION TWO

FILED JAN 25 1940

the allies would have great moral difficulty in opening a front in the Balkans.

Asked if there was anything new in Bulgaria's relations with Greece and Yugoslavia and Rumania he said no that all was satisfactory.

I mentioned the commercial treaty with Russia asking whether any political approach had been made to the Bulgarian Minister of Finance during his stay in Moscow and he said that the Russian attitude was most cordial and was confined exclusively to the economic matters at issue. (I am reliably informed that the Bulgarian delegation had instructions not to entertain any suggestions whatever of a political nature). I also referred to the air agreement between the two countries and to the rumors of a "Russian base at Bourgas." He repeated as he had in our last conversation that these rumors were utterly ridiculous. The convention with Russia was in nowise different from the usual kind.

861.24574

I referred to the possible danger of a German or Russian push towards the Straits or of a combined German-Russian thrust. He said he had had the most formal assurances from Germany that she had no intention of or interest in creating trouble in the Balkans and he believes those assurances to be genuine as he could not see how Germany could benefit through any such move.

On

On the contrary Germany wished above all to have peace in this area in order not to disturb her source of supply. He felt that the theory that a stalemate in the west might drive Germany to push towards the Straits as an act of desperation was fallacious. It was different in the case of Russia whose aim had always been directed towards the Straits but it was in the interest of all the great powers to prevent this. When I interposed "including Germany" he said very much so. He stated that should Russia attempt such a move while Germany was still strong the latter would invade Rumania and block Russia's path in order to save her sources of supply. As to the possibility of a combined push he dismissed this as out of the question owing to the fundamental conflict of interests between the two countries in this part of the world.

The Prime Minister seemed unworried and even cheerful. He was obviously pleased that no political questions were raised during the Russian negotiations and the Turkish visit and his whole attitude was reflected in his remark mentioned at the outset of this telegram that today Bulgaria is not menaced.

(END OF MESSAGE).

MILLARD

RR

0915

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RFP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM

Ankara

Dated January 25, 1940

Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

7, January 25, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office has explained to me that he made his recent stopover in Sofia for the purpose of a frank discussion which would clear the air in view of the many rumors of Bulgaria's intention to combine with Russia or with Germany and in view of a certain degree of genuine fear in Bulgaria as to Turkey's intentions. He offered to the Bulgarian Prime Minister the assurance that Turkey has no hostile intentions and asked only to be assured that the same was true of Bulgaria. The Prime Minister told him that the Bulgarian Government realizes that any attempt to vindicate its territorial claims at the present time would jeopardize the whole Balkan peninsula and is therefore to maintain a policy of neutrality and to hold its claims in abeyance in the hope of reaching satisfactory adjustments by peaceful means after the danger has passed. Upon Numan's

inquiring

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inquiring what would be Bulgaria's attitude if Germany or Russia were to invade the Balkans the Prime Minister expressed his conviction that neither would find it to its interest to do so; but when pressed as to what his Government would do if that contingency were unexpectedly to arise he said that it would fight in defense of its integrity and its right to remain neutral. He declared in answer to further questions that if confronted by a demand to permit passage for invading forces through Bulgarian territory his Government would refuse and would if necessary resist by force rather than plead inability to prevent it. In return for this assurance Numan promised him that so long as Bulgaria effectively maintained its neutrality both Turkey and its allies would respect the Bulgarian frontiers as inviolable.

Two. He expects the forthcoming conference of the Balkan Entente at Belgrade to lead to no concrete results beyond the prolongation of the Entente but to afford a useful opportunity to survey the Balkan situation in the light of present European conditions and to counteract any centrifugal tendencies among its members. He ridiculed current reports that the conference is to be attended by observers on behalf of any nation outside the Entente.

Repeated to Sofia.

EMB

MACMURRAY

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 395 Sofia, January 19, 1940.

Subject: Conversation with the Prime Minister regarding visit of the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office and general European situation.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 4 - 1940
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 12 1940
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Rating
Grade for

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FEB 19 1940

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 19 1940
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

767.74/95

FILED
MAR 6 - 1940

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

767.74/93

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 5, of January 18, 12 noon, summarizing a conversation with the Prime Minister,

1/ and to enclose a memorandum setting forth the conversation in full.

2/ I also enclose a translation of the joint communiqué issued after the meeting (January 11-13) between the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office, quoted in part in my telegram No. 2, of January 14, 3 p.m.

Respectfully yours,

Hugh Millard

Hugh Millard
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:
1. Memorandum of conversation;
2. translation of communiqué.

File 710
HM/MM

4 Carbon Copies
Received

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 395 OF Jan. 19 1940
FROM LEGATION, SOFIA.

Sofia, January 17, 1940.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

between

the Prime Minister and Mr. Millard

I called on the Prime Minister today: He opened the conversation by referring to the recent visit of Mr. Menemenjoglu, the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office.* He said that he had explained to Mr. Menemenjoglu that Bulgaria could not join the Balkan Entente or a neutral bloc. I asked whether Mr. Menemenjoglu had extended to him any such invitation and the Prime Minister replied that he had not, but that he, Mr. Kiosseivanoff, had spontaneously explained Bulgaria's position. He said he had pointed out that today Bulgaria was not menaced, but should Bulgaria join any such pact tomorrow the country might be menaced.

The conversation with the Turkish Secretary General was confined, therefore, to relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and, as shown by the joint communiqué issued, Turkey fully recognized Bulgaria's neutrality and Bulgaria promised to maintain that neutrality. The Prime Minister

added....

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* I am now reliably informed that the Turkish Ambassador in London approached the Bulgarian Minister and asked whether such a meeting would be agreeable to Mr. Kiosseivanoff. This would seem to confirm the suggestion in my telegram No. 2 of January 14, 3 p.m. that the British instigated the meeting.

added in this connection that he had assured Mr. Menemenjoglu that Bulgaria would not be used as a "tremplin" to attack the Straits. I asked whether he had any difficulty in persuading the Turkish Secretary General to accept the Bulgarian position and he said that Mr. Menemenjoglu seemed fully to understand it. The Prime Minister said that the relations with Turkey were "based on the Pact of Friendship of 1925." The Prime Minister explained to Mr. Menemenjoglu, and the latter accepted the thesis, that the relations between the two countries should remain on the friendliest basis--he referred especially to the recent withdrawl of troops in Thrace--but that each country would pursue its own policy quite independently of the other.

I asked specifically whether Mr. Menemenjoglu had endeavored to obtain any "political commitments" from Bulgaria and the Prime Minister replied that he had not. (It will be noted, however, that the Prime Minister, according to his own statement, made Bulgaria's position clear to Mr. Menemenjoglu, namely, that Bulgaria would not join the Balkan Entente or a neutral bloc, and I assume this was done to forestall any soundings by Mr. Menemenjoglu.) Mr. Kiosseivanoff said that he thought the exchange of views with Mr. Menemenjoglu and the communiqué issued had done much to allay any fears in Bulgaria

as....

as to Turkey's intentions and to reassure the Turks that Bulgaria would not become a stepping-stone for an attack on the Straits by Russia or Germany.

I also asked if Mr. Menemenjoglu or any member of the Balkan Entente had invited Bulgaria to send a representative to the forthcoming meeting at Belgrade and he replied that no such approach had been made by anyone. I asked what he thought would transpire at Belgrade and he said that as far as he knew, it was only a regular meeting. He did not seem to think that anything of unusual importance would take place at this meeting. He added, however, that he had no special information on which he could base an opinion, and he did not seem to consider the session of much significance for Bulgaria.

Turning to the subject of Bessarabia, I asked the Prime Minister what he thought Russia's intentions were and he gave the obvious answer: that the Finnish resistance to Russia might either discourage Russia from attempting a similar adventure elsewhere or it might encourage Russia to try to regain the prestige lost by an adventure against a weaker foe. He said it should be realized that Russia, in all her history, had fought well when the campaign was in the south; the Finnish war was not popular in Russia, both the officers and troops questioned the wisdom of this undertaking and, as a consequence, they did not have their hearts in the fighting. Russia is a

cold....

cold country and for centuries they have looked towards the south; a military venture in this direction would, he thought, be a different matter.

I asked whether he still thought the Rumanians would not put up a fight should the Russians attempt to take Bessarabia and what advice they had received; also what he thought Germany might do in such an event. The Prime Minister replied that despite King Carol's recent speech at Kishineff, Bessarabia, he doubted whether the Rumanians would fight or, if they did, whether they would put up a real fight. He said he didn't like to speak ill of an army of any of Bulgaria's neighbors, but said there was perhaps no corruption in the world comparable to that existing in Rumania and gave me to understand that other than purely military means might be effective against that country. He said he thought King Carol's speech was a mistake; he could understand the Rumanian army putting up resistance, but he did not think that the Rumanian position would be strengthened by statements such as the King made.

Asked whether he thought Rumania would receive help in case the Russians invaded Bessarabia and from what source, he said he did not think they would get any assistance. He mentioned that Mr. Sarajoglu implied to "foreign Minister in Ankara" that Bucharest had been given to understand that

the....

the peaceful surrender of Bessarabia would be the wisest course.* I asked whether the French or British had given any indications in the matter and he replied that the French had advised the Rumanians not to fight for Bessarabia. He knew nothing definite about the British, but he believed that Great Britain also would prefer that Bessarabia be given up without a struggle.

I then turned to the question of Germany's position and inquired whether Germany had promised Bessarabia to Russia. He replied that he did not think Germany had taken such a positive position on the question, but believed that Germany would intervene in Rumania should Russia go beyond the Prut, and implied that presumably Russia was aware of this.

Asked regarding Italy's position in such an event, he said Italy "would become involved" should Russia invade Rumania, but added in reply to further questions, that as a revisionist country Italy could not reasonably or properly object should Russia only take "her old province of Bessarabia". He said that Italy would doubtless "resist" should Russia pass the Prut, but was not clear when asked what form Italy's resistance would take.

To recapitulate, I asked whether he thought that

should....

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* Mr. Antonoff, who has just been transferred from his post as Bulgarian Minister at Moscow, informed me today that the Turkish Government made it clear to the Rumanian Government that the Turks would not fight to save Bessarabia.

should Russia take Bessarabia only neither the Allies, Turkey, Italy nor Germany would intervene, and he replied that that was his belief.

I then referred to the possibility of Russia invading Rumania proper. He said that in such a case he believed that Germany would invade Rumania, too. I asked whether, in case Rumania was exposed to the danger of a Russian invasion beyond the Prut, he thought Rumania might go so far as to invite Germany to invade the country. He replied with emphasis that if he were in Rumania's place he would do just that. He said that that might sound traitorous, but it was the lesser of two evils; Rumania was once overrun by Germany and survived as an independent nation. It was not Russia as such which was the danger; even if Russian troops cleared out, Communism would remain. On the other hand, there was always the possibility of a peace which would bring about a withdrawal of the German troops, after which Rumania could again resume her independent existence. Asked whether he thought this idea was seriously considered in high Rumanian quarters, he replied that he believed not. In this relation, he mentioned that he was convinced that in any event Rumania would lose Bessarabia at a peace conference. The people in Bessarabia hate the Rumanian régime, preferring that of Moscow. I remarked that I understood that the majority of the

people....

people were Rumanians; and he said there had already been the beginning of a movement leading up to a voluntary request on the part of the people to become united with the Russians.

I then inquired whether at the present time he thought Bulgaria was exposed to any danger arising from possible activities of the Allies in this area. He replied that he was not worried on this score. He said General Weygand's army of "200 thousand, 300 thousand, 400 thousand," was a heterogeneous mixture of "all varieties and colors" and he did not think they would be a serious fighting unit. When I suggested that the Russian army was apparently not much good either and an invasion of Bessarabia could be made the occasion for Allied action, he said he did not think the Allies were anxious to come to grips with Russia. He then said that it would be difficult on moral grounds for the Allies, "who were the protectors of small neutral nations" to open a front in the Balkans.

Asked if there was anything new in Bulgaria's relations with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania, he said no--there was nothing new whatever and implied that Bulgaria's relations with the three countries were satisfactory.

I broached the subject of the commercial treaty with Russia and reminded him that in our last conversation he had assured me that there were no political

strings....

strings whatever connected with it. I asked whether any approach on political questions had been made to Mr. Bojiloff, the Bulgarian Finance Minister, during his stay in Moscow and he replied that there had been none whatsoever. The Russian attitude had been cordial and was confined entirely to the economic matters at issue. On his departure Mr. Bojiloff paid a visit of courtesy to Mr. Molotoff, but no political subjects were mentioned. (Though the Prime Minister did not of course mention it, I am reliably informed that he was greatly relieved that no embarrassing questions has been asked by the Russians. It will be recalled that, similarly, he was enormously relieved when he had not been asked such questions on his visit to Berlin last summer. See despatch No. 295 of July 19, 1939.)

I also referred to the air agreement and to the rumors of a "Russian base at Bourgas." He repeated, as he had in our last conversation, that these rumors were ridiculous. The air convention with Russia did not differ in the slightest from the usual kind of air conventions which exist between other countries and such as Bulgaria had previously concluded.

I then asked whether he saw any danger of a German or Russian push towards the Straits, or of a combined German-Russian push. He replied he had had the most formal assurances from Germany that that country had no intention of or interest in starting trouble in the Balkans. When Bulgaria had announced

her....

her neutrality, it was Germany who was the first and the most emphatic in expressing approval and appreciation. The Prime Minister said he believed that the assurances he had received were genuine, because he could not see it in Germany's interest to start trouble in the Balkans. On the contrary, Germany wished above all to have peace in this area in order not to disturb these countries as a source of supply. In the last war Germany was in control up to the Straits, but the economy of these countries was so upset that they could not supply much. He said he knew this because Bulgaria also went hungary. He felt, therefore, that the theory that a stale-mate in the west might drive Germany to push towards the Straits as an act of desperation was neither likely nor good strategy. In the case of Russia, there was not the same strategic restraint. Russia's policy had always been and presumably would always look towards the Straits. But it was in the interest of all the great powers to prevent Russia from taking the Straits. I interposed "including Germany?" and he replied very much so. He did not believe, therefore, that Russia could accomplish much in this direction, unless, as he has previously explained to me, the great powers should fight to exhaustion. He believed that the Russian régime was cautious and had no intention of attempting such a venture until such time when opposition becomes negligible. He

repeated,....

repeated, as stated above, that should Russia attempt this while Germany is still strong, Germany would invade Rumania and block Russia's path. Therefore, he continued, it might be in the interest of those wishing to protect the Straits from Russia not to place Germany in a position where she would no longer be strong enough to check Russia.

Turning to the third proposition, I inquired whether he thought there was any possibility of a combined Russian-German push towards the Straits. He dismissed this as quite out of the question owing to the fundamental conflict of interest between those two countries in this part of the world.

As regards the possibility of "a German act of desperation," he said, as he has in previous conversations, that he thought the gravest danger was that Germany would, if driven too far, deliberately throw herself into the arms of Russia, become Bolshevized in the hope of contaminating France and the rest of Europe with Communism in the knowledge that Germany would be the first one to recover therefrom. He said that the Germans were the most disciplined people in the world and that he thought it likely that in such an event they would probably be the first to rid themselves of Communism. He mentioned in this connection that in 1921 he was in Germany in charge of the Bulgarian Legation, at the time of the assassination of Rathenau, and that it was his belief that

Rathenau, in order to unshackle Germany from the bonds of the Versailles Treaty, was planning the Bolshevization of Germany as the prelude to a general Communistic upheaval in Europe, anticipating that through German discipline his country would be the first to throw off the yoke of Communism and eventually attain the desired end.

Before leaving I inquired what he thought of the meeting in Venice between Count Ciano and Count Csaky. He replied that he thought that nothing very definite had been arrived at; the Italian Foreign Minister had doubtless promised aid to Hungary in case of a Russian attack. When I inquired how effective aid could reach Hungary without Yugoslavia taking part, he mentioned "airplanes and money." He added that in any case Germany would doubtless come to Hungary's aid in such a contingency. I then asked if he thought any understanding was reached regarding Rumania and he replied that he believed Count Ciano had urged Hungary not to attack Rumania should Russia march into Bessarabia on the grounds that Russia was the common enemy of both Hungary and Rumania.

As in our last few conversations, Mr. Kiosseivanoff seemed free from worry and displayed that philosophic calm which enables us to bear the tribulations of others when our own interests are not directly endangered.

H.M.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 395,
of January 19, 1940, Sofia.

TRANSLATION

Communiqué published January 13, 1940.

The meeting which has taken place between the President of the Council of Ministers and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office made it possible once more to note the development of the cordial friendship which was initiated upon the conclusion of the Bulgaro-Turkish Pact of Friendship of October 18, 1925, and to confirm the complete unity of views between them regarding the preservation of peace in the Balkans and the observance of the neutrality announced by the Bulgarian Government.

This meeting also afforded an opportunity to emphasize that the measures recently taken by the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments regarding the withdrawal of troops on their common frontier constitute a new manifestation of the policy of confidence and friendship existing between the two countries.

It was noted that the firm resolution of the Turkish Government to respect the neutrality of Bulgaria and the determination of the Bulgarian Government to see that that neutrality is strictly observed are in complete conformity with the policy pursued by the two countries and with their relations as good neighbors.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 1 ACCOMPANYING
DESPATCH 395 OF Jan. 19 1940
FROM LEGATION, SOFIA.

Sofia, January 17, 1940.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

between

the Prime Minister and Mr. Millard

I called on the Prime Minister today: He opened the conversation by referring to the recent visit of Mr. Menemenjoglu, the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office.* He said that he had explained to Mr. Menemenjoglu that Bulgaria could not join the Balkan Entente or a neutral bloc. I asked whether Mr. Menemenjoglu had extended to him any such invitation and the Prime Minister replied that he had not, but that he, Mr. Kiosseivanoff, had spontaneously explained Bulgaria's position. He said he had pointed out that today Bulgaria was not menaced, but should Bulgaria join any such pact tomorrow the country might be menaced.

The conversation with the Turkish Secretary General was confined, therefore, to relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and, as shown by the joint communiqué issued, Turkey fully recognized Bulgaria's neutrality and Bulgaria promised to maintain that neutrality. The Prime Minister

added....

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* I am now reliably informed that the Turkish Ambassador in London approached the Bulgarian Minister and asked whether such a meeting would be agreeable to Mr. Kiosseivanoff. This would seem to confirm the suggestion in my telegram No. 2 of January 14, 3 p.m. that the British instigated the meeting.

added in this connection that he had assured Mr. Menemenjoglu that Bulgaria would not be used as a "tremplin" to attack the Straits. I asked whether he had any difficulty in persuading the Turkish Secretary General to accept the Bulgarian position and he said that Mr. Menemenjoglu seemed fully to understand it. The Prime Minister said that the relations with Turkey were "based on the Pact of Friendship of 1925." The Prime Minister explained to Mr. Menemenjoglu, and the latter accepted the thesis, that the relations between the two countries should remain on the friendliest basis--he referred especially to the recent withdrawl of troops in Thrace--but that each country would pursue its own policy quite independently of the other.

I asked specifically whether Mr. Menemenjoglu had endeavored to obtain any "political commitments" from Bulgaria and the Prime Minister replied that he had not. (It will be noted, however, that the Prime Minister, according to his own statement, made Bulgaria's position clear to Mr. Menemenjoglu, namely, that Bulgaria would not join the Balkan Entente or a neutral bloc, and I assume this was done to forestall any soundings by Mr. Menemenjoglu.) Mr. Kiosseivanoff said that he thought the exchange of views with Mr. Menemenjoglu and the communiqué issued had done much to allay any fears in Bulgaria as....

as to Turkey's intentions and to reassure the Turks that Bulgaria would not become a stepping-stone for an attack on the Straits by Russia or Germany.

I also asked if Mr. Menemenjoglu or any member of the Balkan Entente had invited Bulgaria to send a representative to the forthcoming meeting at Belgrade and he replied that no such approach had been made by anyone. I asked what he thought would transpire at Belgrade and he said that as far as he knew, it was only a regular meeting. He did not seem to think that anything of unusual importance would take place at this meeting. He added, however, that he had no special information on which he could base an opinion, and he did not seem to consider the session of much significance for Bulgaria.

Turning to the subject of Bessarabia, I asked the Prime Minister what he thought Russia's intentions were and he gave the obvious answer: that the Finnish resistance to Russia might either discourage Russia from attempting a similar advanture elsewhere or it might encourage Russia to try to regain the prestige lost by an adventure against a weaker foe. He said it should be realized that Russia, in all her history, had fought well when the campaign was in the south; the Finnish war was not popular in Russia, both the officers and troops questioned the wisdom of this undertaking and, as a consequence, they did not have their hearts in the fighting. Russia is a

cold....

cold country and for centuries they have looked towards the south; a military venture in this direction would, he thought, be a different matter.

I asked whether he still thought the Rumanians would not put up a fight should the Russians attempt to take Bessarabia and what advice they had received; also what he thought Germany might do in such an event. The Prime Minister replied that despite King Carol's recent speech at Kishineff, Bessarabia, he doubted whether the Rumanians would fight or, if they did, whether they would put up a real fight. He said he didn't like to speak ill of an army of any of Bulgaria's neighbors, but said there was perhaps no corruption in the world comparable to that existing in Rumania and gave me to understand that other than purely military means might be effective against that country. He said he thought King Carol's speech was a mistake; he could understand the Rumanian army putting up resistance, but he did not think that the Rumanian position would be strengthened by statements such as the King made.

Asked whether he thought Rumania would receive help in case the Russians invaded Bessarabia and from what source, he said he did not think they would get any assistance. He mentioned that Mr. Sarajoglu implied to "foreign Minister in Ankara" that Bucharest had been given to understand that

the....

the peaceful surrender of Bessarabia would be the wisest course.* I asked whether the French or British had given any indications in the matter and he replied that the French had advised the Rumanians not to fight for Bessarabia. He knew nothing definite about the British, but he believed that Great Britain also would prefer that Bessarabia be given up without a struggle.

I then turned to the question of Germany's position and inquired whether Germany had promised Bessarabia to Russia. He replied that he did not think Germany had taken such a positive position on the question, but believed that Germany would intervene in Rumania should Russia go beyond the Prut, and implied that presumably Russia was aware of this.

Asked regarding Italy's position in such an event, he said Italy "would become involved" should Russia invade Rumania, but added in reply to further questions, that as a revisionist country Italy could not reasonably or properly object should Russia only take "her old province of Bessarabia". He said that Italy would doubtless "resist" should Russia pass the Prut, but was not clear when asked what form Italy's resistance would take.

To recapitulate, I asked whether he thought that

should....

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* Mr. Antonoff, who has just been transferred from his post as Bulgarian Minister at Moscow, informed me today that the Turkish Government made it clear to the Rumanian Government that the Turks would not fight to save Bessarabia.

should Russia take Bessarabia only neither the Allies, Turkey, Italy nor Germany would intervene, and he replied that that was his belief.

I then referred to the possibility of Russia invading Rumania proper. He said that in such a case he believed that Germany would invade Rumania, too. I asked whether, in case Rumania was exposed to the danger of a Russian invasion beyond the Prut, he thought Rumania might go so far as to invite Germany to invade the country. He replied with emphasis that if he were in Rumania's place he would do just that. He said that that might sound traitorous, but it was the lesser of two evils; Rumania was once overrun by Germany and survived as an independent nation. It was not Russia as such which was the danger; even if Russian troops cleared out, Communism would remain. On the other hand, there was always the possibility of a peace which would bring about a withdrawal of the German troops, after which Rumania could again resume her independent existence. Asked whether he thought this idea was seriously considered in high Rumanian quarters, he replied that he believed not. In this relation, he mentioned that he was convinced that in any event Rumania would lose Bessarabia at a peace conference. The people in Bessarabia hate the Rumanian régime, preferring that of Moscow. I remarked that I understood that the majority of the

people....

people were Rumanians; and he said there had already been the beginning of a movement leading up to a voluntary request on the part of the people to become united with the Russians.

I then inquired whether at the present time he thought Bulgaria was exposed to any danger arising from possible activities of the Allies in this area. He replied that he was not worried on this score. He said General Weygand's army of "300 thousand, 300 thousand, 400 thousand," was a heterogeneous mixture of "all varieties and colors" and he did not think they would be a serious fighting unit. When I suggested that the Russian army was apparently not much good either and an invasion of Bessarabia could be made the occasion for Allied action, he said he did not think the Allies were anxious to come to grips with Russia. He then said that it would be difficult on moral grounds for the Allies, "who were the protectors of small neutral nations" to open a front in the Balkans.

Asked if there was anything new in Bulgaria's relations with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania, he said no--there was nothing new whatever and implied that Bulgaria's relations with the three countries were satisfactory.

I broached the subject of the commercial treaty with Russia and reminded him that in our last conversation he had assured me that there were no political strings....

strings whatever connected with it. I asked whether any approach on political questions had been made to Mr. Bojiloff, the Bulgarian Finance Minister, during his stay in Moscow and he replied that there had been none whatsoever. The Russian attitude had been cordial and was confined entirely to the economic matters at issue. On his departure Mr. Bojiloff paid a visit of courtesy to Mr. Molotoff, but no political subjects were mentioned. (Though the Prime Minister did not of course mention it, I am reliably informed that he was greatly relieved that no embarrassing questions has been asked by the Russians. It will be recalled that, similarly, he was enormously relieved when he had not been asked such questions on his visit to Berlin last summer. See despatch No. 295 of July 19, 1939.)

I also referred to the air agreement and to the rumors of a "Russian base at Bourgas." He repeated, as he had in our last conversation, that these rumors were ridiculous. The air convention with Russia did not differ in the slightest from the usual kind of air conventions which exist between other countries and such as Bulgaria had previously concluded.

I then asked whether he saw any danger of a German or Russian push towards the Straits, or of a combined German-Russian push. He replied he had had the most formal assurances from Germany that that country had no intention of or interest in starting trouble in the Balkans. When Bulgaria had announced

her....

her neutrality, it was Germany who was the first and the most emphatic in expressing approval and appreciation. The Prime Minister said he believed that the assurances he had received were genuine, because he could not see it in Germany's interest to start trouble in the Balkans. On the contrary, Germany wished above all to have peace in this area in order not to disturb these countries as a source of supply. In the last war Germany was in control up to the Straits, but the economy of these countries was so upset that they could not supply much. He said he knew this because Bulgaria also went hungary. He felt, therefore, that the theory that a stale-mate in the west might drive Germany to push towards the Straits as an act of desperation was neither likely nor good strategy. In the case of Russia, there was not the same strategic restraint. Russia's policy had always been and presumably would always look towards the Straits. But it was in the interest of all the great powers to prevent Russia from taking the Straits. I interposed "including Germany?" and he replied very much so. He did not believe, therefore, that Russia could accomplish much in this direction, unless, as he has previously explained to me, the great powers should fight to exhaustion. He believed that the Russian régime was cautious and had no intention of attempting such a venture until such time when opposition becomes negligible. He

repeated,....

repeated, as stated above, that should Russia attempt this while Germany is still strong, Germany would invade Rumania and block Russia's path. Therefore, he continued, it might be in the interest of those wishing to protect the Straits from Russia not to place Germany in a position where she would no longer be strong enough to check Russia.

Turning to the third proposition, I inquired whether he thought there was any possibility of a combined Russian-German push towards the Straits. He dismissed this as quite out of the question owing to the fundamental conflict of interest between these two countries in this part of the world.

As regards the possibility of "a German act of desperation," he said, as he has in previous conversations, that he thought the gravest danger was that Germany would, if driven too far, deliberately throw herself into the arms of Russia, become Bolshevized in the hope of contaminating France and the rest of Europe with Communism in the knowledge that Germany would be the first one to recover therefrom. He said that the Germans were the most disciplined people in the world and that he thought it likely that in such an event they would probably be the first to rid themselves of Communism. He mentioned in this connection that in 1921 he was in Germany in charge of the Bulgarian Legation, at the time of the assassination of Rathenau, and that it was his belief that

Rathenau,....

Rathenau, in order to unshackle Germany from the bonds of the Versailles Treaty, was planning the Bolshevization of Germany as the prelude to a general Communistic upheaval in Europe, anticipating that through German discipline his country would be the first to throw off the yoke of Communism and eventually attain the desired end.

Before leaving I inquired what he thought of the meeting in Venice between Count Ciano and Count Csaky. He replied that he thought that nothing very definite had been arrived at; the Italian Foreign Minister had doubtless promised aid to Hungary in case of a Russian attack. When I inquired how effective aid could reach Hungary without Yugoslavia taking part, he mentioned "airplanes and money." He added that in any case Germany would doubtless come to Hungary's aid in such a contingency. I then asked if he thought any understanding was reached regarding Rumania and he replied that he believed Count Ciano had urged Hungary not to attack Rumania should Russia march into Bessarabia on the grounds that Russia was the common enemy of both Hungary and Rumania.

As in our last few conversations, Mr. Kiosseivanoff seemed free from worry and displayed that philosophic calm which enables us to bear the tribulations of others when our own interests are not directly endangered.

H.M.

HM/RG

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 395,
of January 19, 1940, Sofia.

TRANSLATION

Communiqué published January 13, 1940.

The meeting which has taken place between the President of the Council of Ministers and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office made it possible once more to note the development of the cordial friendship which was initiated upon the conclusion of the Bulgaro-Turkish Pact of Friendship of October 18, 1925, and to confirm the complete unity of views between them regarding the preservation of peace in the Balkans and the observance of the neutrality announced by the Bulgarian Government.

This meeting also afforded an opportunity to emphasize that the measures recently taken by the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments regarding the withdrawal of troops on their common frontier constitute a new manifestation of the policy of confidence and friendship existing between the two countries.

It was noted that the firm resolution of the Turkish Government to respect the neutrality of Bulgaria and the determination of the Bulgarian Government to see that that neutrality is strictly observed are in complete conformity with the policy pursued by the two countries and with their relations as good neighbors.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

PHA Ankara No. 1346 Jan. 30

WSM Subj: Visit of Menemencioglu to Sophia

(This is not what one would term inspired political reporting. It gives no evidence of imagination whatsoever, and except for the first paragraph, no news.)

The Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office went to Sofia Jan. 11-13 to learn what Bulgaria would do in the event of "various possible developments in the Balkans." Upon being insured that Bulgaria would remain neutral even in the event of a German or Russian invasion of the Balkans, Menemincioglu gave assurances that so long as Bulgaria lived up to this promise, Turkey would hold the Bulgarian frontier inviolate.

The remainder of the despatch consists of quotations from official communiques, speeches and newspaper editorials, all expressing in much the same words the close and friendly relations between Turkey and Bulgaria.

(The despatch is 8 pages, mostly single space.)

GVA

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Ankara, Turkey,

January 30, 1940.

No. 1346

Subject: Visit to Sofia of the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 24 1940
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 5 1940
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1940 FEB 23 PM 3 47

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
MR. DUNN
FEB 27 1940
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

767.74/96

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Supplementing my telegraphic report, I have the honor to submit the following information with regard to the visit to Sofia on January 11-13, 1940, of the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office.

FILED
MAR 6 1940

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE
MAR 4 - 1940

As I have reported to the Department, it would appear that the purpose of this visit was to ascertain the views and intentions of the Bulgarian Government in the event of various possible developments in the Balkans. Upon being assured that the Bulgarian Government did not

propose

propose to endeavor to realize at the present time its territorial claims but was resolved to maintain strict neutrality, even in the event of a German or Russian invasion of the Balkans, Mr. Menemencioglu assured the Bulgarian Prime Minister that so long as Bulgaria effectively maintained its neutrality, the Bulgarian frontiers would be held inviolable by both Turkey and its allies. The essence of these mutual assurances was somewhat guardedly made public in the official communiqué issued in Sofia on January 13, wherein it was stated that the meeting which had taken place between the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and the Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

> "furnished the occasion to emphasize once more the development of the cordial friendship resulting from the Bulgarian-Turkish Treaty of October 18, 1925, and to reaffirm the complete identity of the views of the two countries with regard to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans and the safeguarding of the neutrality proclaimed by the Bulgarian Government.
>
> "Furthermore the meeting has permitted the confirmation that the measures adopted by the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments in regard to the withdrawal of troops from the common frontier constituted a new manifestation of the policy of trust and friendship existing between the two countries.
>
> "It has been established that the determination of the Turkish Government to respect the neutrality of Bulgaria and the determination of the Bulgarian Government to see to it that this neutrality is strictly maintained are in entire conformity with the requirements of the policy pursued by the two countries and the requirements of their relations of good neighborliness".

It is of interest to note that, following the conversations in Sofia, there have been a series of public statements by official personages, which were obviously designed to assure public opinion that the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria are on a most friendly basis

and that the two Governments are in full agreement with regard to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans. Mr. Menemencioglu, upon his return to Turkey on January 14, made the following statement to the press with regard to his visit to Sofia:

> "I am anxious to emphasize especially the good reception which I received in Bulgaria. His Majesty the King expressed to me in terms of really deep sincerity the feelings of friendship which he entertains for our National Chief. As is evident from the communiqué which has just been made public, the interviews which I had with Mr. Kiosseivanoff, the eminent President of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, are of special importance for relations between the two countries.
>
> "I can tell you explicitly that we felt a keen satisfaction in noting a complete identity of our views on all the questions which we discussed. It would not be too optimistic to expect that these conversations will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans and will permit the entire Balkan family to envisage the future with greater confidence.
>
> "At Sofia I was in contact with the Ministers of England and France and of the countries of the Balkan Entente. I was glad to note among our Balkan allies as well as in the countries which I visited the deep sympathy and confidence which our country and our loyal policy inspire."

The President of the Turkish Council of Ministers in an address delivered in the Grand National Assembly on January 18 made the following statement with regard to the visit of Mr. Menemencioglu to Sofia:

> "The conversations which the chief of our delegation had during his sojourn in Sofia with Mr. Kiosseivanoff, eminent President of the Council of Bulgaria, furnished the occasion for a manifestation of the trusting friendship between the two neighboring countries and the establishment of a satisfactory identity of views in respect to our efforts aiming to stabilize peace and security in the Balkans."

On January 19 the Turkish press published the following exchange of telegrams between President Ismet Inönü and King Boris of Bulgaria:

"<u>His</u>

"His Majesty Boris III
King of Bulgaria
Sofia.

"I thank Your Majesty sincerely for the friendly words which you were so kind as to transmit to me through Mr. Menemencioglu.

"The recent meeting in Sofia has shown an entire agreement of views between the Governments of the two neighboring and friendly countries. I am especially happy to express to Your Majesty on this occasion the deep satisfaction which I feel and to reiterate to you the assurance of my complete friendship.

INÖNÜ".

"His Excellency Ismet Inönu
President of the Republic,
Ankara.

"Deeply moved by the friendly message which Your Excellency addressed to me, I hasten to thank you heartily for it and to renew the assurances of my most sincere friendship.

"The visit to Sofia of Mr. Menemencioglu, whose acquaintance I was very happy to make, gave us the occasion to establish in fact the agreement of the views of our Governments and to confirm the friendship and confidence between our two neighboring and friendly countries.

BORIS".

On two occasions the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Saracoglu, in statements to the press, made friendly remarks with reference to Bulgaria. On January 23 he stated:

> "As we have said more than once, the Balkan Entente is still open to Bulgaria. I should add that although it does not form a part of the Entente, Bulgaria follows European events with an essentially Balkan mind and pursues a loyal policy with regard to its neighbors.
>
> "No decision has been taken with respect to an interview between Mr. Kiosseivanoff and myself. However, should the occasion present itself, such a meeting would be welcomed with great satisfaction".

On January 25 he stated:

"I

"I can assure you that Turkish-Bulgarian relations have now begun to develop most favorably. The conversations which the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Numan Menemencioglu, had at Sofia with the Bulgarian Premier, Mr. Kiosseivanoff, have had very favorable results. One may consider these contacts as well as the friendly telegrams exchanged between our National Chief and His Majesty King Boris, as the first manifestations of the happy development entered upon in the relations of the two neighboring nations".

On January 23 the Turkish press reported that the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Mr. Kiosseivanoff, had received a special representative of the Istanbul newspaper TAN and made to him the following statements:

"Since I have taken over the reins of the Bulgarian Government and especially since my statements at the time of my visit to Ankara I have been announcing most clearly to the whole world that the Bulgarian nation and those who are trying to have it live in perfect calm and tranquillity are pursuing four unchangeable and unshakeable ideals:

"1. Maintenance of peace;
"2. A complete neutrality assuring this peace;
"3. Cultivation of good relations with neighboring States;
"4. Reparation in an equitable and friendly way of the wrongs which the recent past has caused to Bulgaria.

"We are convinced that these four ideals will be gradually realized. Is there any one who does not desire that complete peace should reign in the Balkans?

"Our neighbors are also making the greatest efforts to insure peace. What advantage could Bulgaria obtain from war - Bulgaria which has already received several wounds, and which has to overcome a great number of difficulties? Why have we been trying to elevate ourselves for many years and to have our people enjoy tranquillity and well-being? We cannot rush into adventures the outcome of which is unknown to us at a time when we are engaged in this pursuit.

"We, as well as you, are a nation which knows to the smallest detail what war means.

"As for the policy of neutrality, I can sum it up in a single phrase: One cannot indicate a single reason which could lead Bulgaria away from neutrality, and we know very well, and I am personally convinced, that there is nothing in the world which cannot be solved when people are mutually moved by friendly sentiments and good will. We are certain of our friendships. We are very friendly with Yugoslavia; our relations with Turkey are becoming closer from day to day. Our relations with the other neighboring countries are normal. Since this is true, can there be any insoluble questions?

"As we have always declared, we are not going to be content merely to remain neutral, but in this period of trouble we shall not cause the slightest difficulty for our neighbors.

"Our wish for all consists in seeing that the whole of the Balkans remains outside of the great conflagration; we firmly hope to see it remain that way."

In commenting on the visit of Mr. Menemencioglu to Sofia, the Turkish press emphasized the great service rendered to the cause of peace in the Balkans by the reaffirmation of Turkish-Bulgarian friendship and the assurances exchanged between the two countries. It was pointed out that while Bulgaria and Turkey pursue different policies, each in conformity with its own interests, their views are identical with regard to safeguarding the peace of the Balkans. The essential points of the official communiqué were stated to be the establishment of the identity of the views of the Turkish and Bulgarian Governments with regard to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans and the assurance given by Turkey that she will respect Bulgarian neutrality and that given by Bulgaria that she will maintain a strict neutrality. As reflecting the views of the Government leaders with regard to the visit of Mr. Menemencioglu to Sofia, there is quoted below a leading article by Falih Rifki Atay published in the Ankara ULUS of January 15, 1940:

"The

"The official communiqué published after these conversations does not reflect only the formal expression of friendship which unites our two countries. For one who has followed with special attention the development of Bulgarian policy and the policy of peace and security of the Balkan countries there is a heartening clearness in a certain passage of this communiqué. In the communiqué, the development of the friendship which exists between the two nations since the conclusion of the Turkish-Bulgarian pact, dating from 1925, is once more confirmed, and the complete identity of the views of the two Governments with regard to the maintenance of Bulgarian neutrality and the safeguarding of peace in the Balkans is noted. Finally it is stated: 'It has been established that the determination of the Turkish Government to respect the neutrality of Bulgaria and the determination of the Bulgarian Government to see to it that this neutrality is strictly maintained are in entire conformity with the requirements of the policy pursued by the two countries and the requirements of their relations of good neighborliness'.

* * * * * * * * * * *

"If there are people interested in setting fire to the Balkans their only hope consists no doubt in exploiting the clash of interests or tendencies to conflict existing among the Balkan nations. But, above these conflicting interests and these tendencies there is a higher motive, a vital one, which invites the Balkans to unite for the defense of order and peace: this is the price set on the liberty and independence of the Balkan nations. It is important that no room should be left for misunderstanding by drawing a sharp distinction between the various problems which arise among the Balkan nations and those which arise with regard to their collective security.

"To believe that any complication whatever which arose in the Balkans might in the end be of advantage to any of the Balkan countries, would be to give evidence of great ignorance with respect to the lessons of the most recent as well as the most distant past. There is no doubt that the neutrality of Bulgaria and the will of the Bulgarian Government to exert itself in favor of the maintenance of peace in the Balkans will have great weight on the subsequent development of events.

"Turkey is a country which has no ground for quarreling with Bulgaria. No one doubts that the Turkish policy in the Balkans is solely inspired by the desire to serve the cause of the security and the happiness of the nations of the peninsula. The confidence and sincerity which characterize Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the matter of the withdrawal of troops from the common frontier, and

which

which was recently confirmed, this confidence and sincerity have caused unanimous satisfaction everywhere. The reason therefor is that each justly appreciates the great importance of this friendship for the maintenance of order and peace in the Balkans.

"We are sure that the first guarantee contained in the official communiqué published as a result of the visit to Sofia of the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will not fail also to produce happy repercussions."

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMURRAY.

Copy sent to American Legation, Sofia.

K

030/710

RFK:ah:mej

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turks still had a large number of troops on Bulgaria's Thracian frontier;

Recent reports that contrary to the understanding reached last November the-

mr

767.74/97

97

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #20, 4 p.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Mar. 1, 1940 **From / To** Bulgaria (Millard)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/1748

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkey has no intention of making an attack on Bulgaria unless in the event of its appearing necessary to forestall an attack upon herself from that quarter.

767.74/98

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #26, 3 a.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Mar. 15, 1940 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/1823

98

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Reports that contrary to the understanding reached last November between Bulgaria and Turkey, the Turks had a large number of troops on the Thracian frontier.

Conversation with the new Bulgarian Foreign Minister regarding-

767.74/99

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #434
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Mar. 2, 1940 **From** Bulgaria (Millard)
To

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/1955

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Incidents on the Rumanian and Turkish frontiers: Report on - which were immediately and amicably settled by the Bulgarian, Rumanian and Turkish authorities.

767.74/100

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Despatch #437
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Mar. 8, 1940 From / To Bulgaria (Millard)

File No. 771.74/109

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

hr

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkish Concentration or military movements on the Bulgarian frontier.
Turkish general staff denied rumors of -.

rr

767.74/101

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#51, 4 p.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 10, 1940 From / To } Turkey (MacMurray)

101

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/2825

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Rumors circulated among Bulgarians that Bulgaria is about to be invaded by age old oppressor Turkey at instigation of Allies.

Reports-

mr

767.74/102

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #53, 3 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 4, 1940 From / To Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/3498

102

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

Bulgarian Foreign Minister expressed concern over large numbers of Turkish troops on the border.

767.74/103

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#58, 6pm.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

103

Dated June 7, 1940. From / To } Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 740.00111-European War, 1939/475

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Bulgarian troops concentrated on the Turkish frontier; In case of an invasion of the Peninsula the Turkish Army would be tempted to advance into Bulgarian territory to a more secure line of defense.

mr

767.74/104

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #112, 1 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 29, 1940 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/4293 Confidential File

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Statement by Turkish Ambassador that recent Bulgarian military preparations could only in the final analysis be directed against Turkey in consequence of which the Turkish Government had taken measures to meet any attack.

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #1360, 5 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Oct. 17, 1940 **From / To** U.S.S.R. (Steinhardt)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/6137 Confidential File

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

Confidential

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Movement of Bulgarian troops to the Turkish frontier.
Reports concerning -.

rr

767.74/106

106

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#151, 9 p.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Oct. 31, 1940 From / To Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/6388

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

Assertion by Bulgarian Foreign Minister of Bulgaria's determination to preserve peace, and that Bulgaria would under no condition attack Turkey or Greece.

mjd

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #165, 4 p.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated November 21, 1940 From/To Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 762.74/63

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74/107

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkey and Bulgaria have exchanged satisfactory assurances of their mutual friendly intentions.

767.74/108

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #214, 4 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Dec. 9, 1940 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/7064

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

801

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria.

Information concerning,- Comments on conversation of Turkish Ambassador with Molotov.

FLH

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel # 49 9 PM
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Jan. 10, 1941 From / To USSR(Steinhardt)

File No. 761.74/68 Confidential File

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74/109

Confidential File

109

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkish-Bulgarian talks;

Information that- going on in Ankara and Sofia.

mr

767.74/110

110

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #34, 5 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Jan. 24, 1941 From/To Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/7897

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkish-Bulgarian declaration.

Views of the Secretary General of the Foreign Office as to the significance and bearing of the-

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #37, 2 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated feb. 21, 1941 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/8558

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74/1111

PS/GC

111

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Report that recent agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey concluded with active cooperation of the Soviet Union;

PRAVDA publishes Tass communique that Swiss newspaper BASLER NACHRICHTEN published- Tass authorized to state this report does not appear with the facts.

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #346, 2 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 23, 1941 **From / To** U.S.S.R. (Steinhardt)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/8556

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74/112

PS/GC

112

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY: STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL:

Recent Turco-Bulgarian declaration.
Interpretations placed upon the- by Turkey and Bulgaria.

wha

767.74/113

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #36, 1 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 21, 1941 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/8559 Confidential File

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

Confidential File

PS/EC

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey to be signed tomorrow.

Provisions of-

767.74/114

mr

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #31, 5 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 16, 1941 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

Confidential File

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/8415

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

PS/GC Confidential File 114

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Turkish-Bulgarian relations;

Reliable sources believe that a joint Turkish-Bulgarian communique will be issued today regarding friendly relations between the two countries.

mr

767.74/115

PS/GC

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #72, 5 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 17, 1941 From/To Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/8433

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 1 - 1941
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

S
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:
February 25, 1941

SUBJECT: Turkish-Bulgarian Pact

PARTICIPANTS: The Ambassador of Turkey, Mr. Mehmet Münir Ertegün; the Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, A-B, PA/D, Eu, NE

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 28 1941
NOTED

GPO 1—1493

767.74

The Turkish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador said that he was calling by instruction of his Government to make clear in an official way to this Government the position of Turkey in view of the misinterpretation which had been given in the American press to the recent pact concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria.

The Ambassador delivered to me the public statement made by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs as conveyed to the Department by Ambassador MacMurray. He further stated that, as I knew, the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey for a nonaggression pact had been

767.74/116 PS/DB
FILED
MAR 25 1941

116

going on for some three or four months and that the sole objective on the part of the Turkish Government in concluding the pact was to secure the assurance that in the event Turkey was obliged to defend herself against German aggression, the fifteen Bulgarian divisions would not be used against Turkey. The Ambassador seemed to feel that the pact recently concluded provided satisfactory assurances in this sense.

I asked the Ambassador for his interpretation of certain portions of the Turkish Foreign Minister's public statement, notably that portion which declared that Turkey could not view with indifference activities of other powers within Turkey's "zone of interest". I asked whether I was to understand that this meant that in the event Germany undertook aggressive action against Greece, Turkey would render assistance to Greece both because of this statement and because of Turkey's existing engagements to Greece, which the same statement said remained unimpaired.

The Ambassador replied that it should be regarded as clear that both Bulgaria and Greece were within the Turkish "zone of interest". He said, however, that what action Turkey would take in the event that Germany occupied Bulgaria or entered the war against Greece would depend

necessarily upon practical considerations. He said that Turkey above all did not wish to make the same mistake as that made by France and undertake to fight on strategic lines which had not been prepared in advance. The Ambassador said that for defensive operations, Turkey believed that their existing lines of defense, as well as the natural Turkish terrain, were admirably fitted for successful operations but that the movement of Turkish forces outside of these lines of defense was another matter. Whether the Ambassador was completely informed or not, I gained very definitely the impression that his own personal belief was that the material assistance which Turkey might give Greece in the event that Germany moved against Greece would be of very little significance.

U:SW:DMK

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister that the Bulgarian adherence to the Three Power Pact was a gross violation of the declaration between Turkey and Bulgaria.

mr

767.74/117

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #50, 5 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated March 3, 1941 From/To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 740.0011 European War, 1939/8750

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 20, 1941

SUBJECT: Turco-Bulgarian Non-Aggression Agreement.

March 4, 1941

PARTICIPANTS: Turkish Ambassador
Mr. Murray

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FEB 21 1941 MR. BERLE

Ankara 2/25/41 GVA/GC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FEB 25 1941 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE FEB 25 1941 NOTED

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FEB 20 1941 MR. WELLES

COPIES TO: Ankara

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 6 - 1941 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

767.74/118

767.74

o-r-o 1—1408

The Turkish Ambassador called on me by appointment yesterday and left the attached official text, in French translation, of the lately negotiated Turco-Bulgarian non-aggression agreement. The Ambassador confirmed my understanding that the present agreement is in fact a reaffirmation of the substance of an earlier one negotiated as long ago as 1925. He added that he had in fact been instrumental in the negotiation of the earlier agreement.

Mr. Ertegün said he was somewhat disturbed by American press reaction to this agreement since it seemed to impute rather sinister designs to Turkey which he felt sure were not justified. He added that while he was not officially informed as to the circumstances surrounding the

FILED

PS/DB MAR 7 - 1941

the present agreement, he was confident there were compelling reasons which motivated the agreement at this time. Mr. Ertegün went on to say that a critical situation has existed for some time along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier where there had been large concentrations of troops on each side. The present agreement would undoubtedly result in the withdrawal of the troops on both sides, and Turkey was now assured that even if she should be attacked by Germany, Bulgaria would not participate in the attack.

Mr. Ertegün went on to say that Turkey was not prepared to launch an offensive-defensive action in order to prevent the entry of German troops into Bulgaria. If she had endeavored to take such action she would have inevitably come into immediate conflict with Germany outside Turkish territory and would have run the risk of being attacked simultaneously by Soviet Russia. Such a development could not possibly have been in the best interest of Great Britain, who is certainly not in a position to assist Turkey adequately in any such crisis. Turkey is prepared and determined to stand fast at the Dardanelles in order to block Germany's passage into Asia. If Turkey meanwhile runs the risk of defeat in endeavoring to block German passage into Bulgaria, the

chief

chief bastion of British defense in that area might collapse and the whole of the Near East and Asia would be at Germany's feet.

As far as Bulgaria is concerned, the Ambassador said he had great sympathy for her in her present dilemma and added that if he were a Bulgarian he would pursue no other course. Bulgaria had been defeated, mutilated and disarmed in the first World War and had never been allowed to equip herself properly for defense even against countries far less powerful than Germany. It was a great misfortune, in his opinion, that the various Balkan countries which had seized Bulgarian territory after the World War had consistently refused to compensate Bulgaria sufficiently in order to induce her to join the Balkan Entente. The Balkan Entente as it was finally set up without Bulgaria was in fact a sort of "gang-up" against that little country to prevent its regaining any of its lost territory. If Bulgaria could have been brought into the Entente, a fairly impressive bloc of Balkan countries determined to stand on their own feet and to exclude the pressure and intrigues of the Great Powers could have come into being and the present developments might have been avoided. But with Bulgaria left dissatisfied and receiving her first encouragement from the Germans

when

when the Dobrudja was returned to Bulgaria by Rumania under German pressure, the present developments became inevitable.

The Ambassador closed his conversation with an expression of his earnest hope that this war could be terminated before it was too late to prevent a world disaster. With a smile, he said he realized such talk was regarded in this country as "Fifth Columnist", but he was nevertheless persuaded that unless some early settlement could be reached all of Europe, including his own country, would sink into a chaos like that of the Dark Ages and that we would be unable to prevent the Bolshevization of the entire continent of Europe. I may say that the Ambassador has on several occasions taken this line and he seems to be obsessed with the idea that the only hope for the world is for the United States to announce its views as to a just settlement and, if necessary, impose it. In reply to my observation that a peace settlement at this juncture would necessarily be a Hitler peace, he stated that in his opinion any settlement would have to take into account that some of England's claims are "unjust" and some of Germany's are "just". The problem, said the Ambassador, was to do justice to all.

NE WSM/LS

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 20, 1941

SUBJECT: Turco-Bulgarian Non-Aggression Agreement.

PARTICIPANTS: Turkish Ambassador
Mr. Murray

COPIES TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 5 - 1941 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FEB 20 1941 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 28 1941

GPO 1—1493

The Turkish Ambassador called on me by appointment yesterday and left the attached official text, in French translation, of the lately negotiated Turco-Bulgarian non-aggression agreement. The Ambassador confirmed my understanding that the present agreement is in fact a reaffirmation of the substance of an earlier one negotiated as long ago as 1925. He added that he had in fact been instrumental in the negotiation of the earlier agreement.

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when

March 4, 1941

No. 524

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To the

American Ambassador,

Ankara.

The Secretary of State encloses herewith, for the Embassy's strictly confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of conversation, dated February 20, 1941, between the Turkish Ambassador in Washington and the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, regarding the Turco-Bulgarian non-aggression agreement of February 17, 1941.

767.74

767.74/118

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation,
February 20, 1941.

NE:GVA/GC
2/25/41

MAR 3 1941 PM

A true copy of the signed original.

118

PS/DB

when the Dobrudja was returned to Bulgaria by Rumania under German pressure, the present developments became inevitable.

The Ambassador closed his conversation with an expression of his earnest hope that this war could be terminated before it was too late to prevent a world disaster. With a smile, he said he realized such talk was regarded in this country as "Fifth Columnist", but he was nevertheless persuaded that unless some early settlement could be reached all of Europe, including his own country, would sink into a chaos like that of the Dark Ages and that we would be unable to prevent the Bolshevization of the entire continent of Europe. I may say that the Ambassador has on several occasions taken this line and he seems to be obsessed with the idea that the only hope for the world is for the United States to announce its views as to a just settlement and, if necessary, impose it. In reply to my observation that a peace settlement at this juncture would necessarily be a Hitler peace, he stated that in his opinion any settlement would have to take into account that some of England's claims are "unjust" and some of Germany's are "just". The problem, said the Ambassador, was to do justice to all.

NE WSM/LS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 9 - 1941
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM

MP

GRAY

Sofia

Dated October 7, 1941

Rec'd. 10:08 a. m.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 9 1941
file: rec

Secretary of State,

Washington

409, October 7, 11 a. m.

Speaking in Varna on October 5 the President of the Parliament described Bulgarian-Turkish relations as "friendlier than ever before". As regards the Soviet Union he stated that Bulgaria has always had sympathy for the Russian people but not for Bolshevism. He maintained that Bulgaria has always been correct in its relations with the Soviet Government but that the latter has not reciprocated in respect to its relations with Bulgaria. The President stressed Bulgaria's readiness to defend herself emphasizing that Bulgaria's policy is the protection of its sovereignty independence and liberty.

EARLE

ALC

767.74
note
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767.74/119

FILED
OCT 10 1941

PS/VB

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

767.74/120

SUBJECT Relations between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria:

Bulgaria has always stressed sympathy for the Russian people but not for Bolshevism; states that, ~~s~~ have always been good as far as Bulgaria was concerned.

vib

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#409, 11am
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated October 7, 1941 From ~~To~~ Bulgaria (Earle)

File No. 767.74/119

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

MP

GRAY

Sofia

Dated October 7, 1941

Rec'd. 10:08 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

409, October 7, 11 a. m.

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EARLE

ALC

EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 24 1941
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM GRAY

Sofia

Dated November 21, 1941

Rec'd 5:56 p.m.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 22 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

455, November 21, 4 p.m.

767.74

In an interview with a correspondent of the BERLINER BORSEN ZEITUNG copied by the local press Prime Minister Filoff denies tension in Bulgarian Turkish relations. "For the present," he is quoted as saying, "Bulgarian-Turkish relations are based on mutual confidence. I am happy to be able to say that in a time of great political events such as the present our relations with our neighbors are good and in some cases even friendly."

EARLE

GW

767.74/121
PS/BH
FILED
NOV 25 1941

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CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria:
Information regarding -.

767.74/ 122

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Telegram #98 3pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 23, 1942 From / To Turkey (Kelley)

File No. 740.0011 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/19688

PS/LH

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

767.74/

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Turkish-Bulgarian relations: Information regarding -.

767.74/123

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel #106
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 26, 1942 From / To Turkey (Kelley)

File No. 740.0011 EUROPEAN WAR 1939 /19806

PS/GD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1840

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WMC

FROM

PLAIN

Ankara

Dated April 15, 1942

Rec'd 8:28 p.m.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
APR 15 1942
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

273

~~876~~, Fifteenth

Deputy Sadak referring in yesterday's AKSHAM to recent change in Bulgarian Cabinet and to speech of Bulgarian Prime Minister in connection therewith in which he spoke of Bulgarian friendship for Turkey asserts that having spoken thus after King Boris conferences with Germans his statement demonstrates that Turco Bulgarian friendship is in harmony with German policy. He states that although Turks are widely separated from Bulgarians so far as concerns their views on high policy and on rights and independence of peoples the Bulgarians will find only good feeling and have nothing to mistrust so long as they on their side of common frontier have real and unquestionable consideration for Turks. Friendship between Turks and Germans he continues has necessarily

767.74/124

PS/EM

APR 21 1942

necessarily some connection with German Bulgarian friendship as affected by the war and Balkan situation. Today, he concludes, this friendship has a tangible result in that Bulgarian frontier is secure althouth German army has departed and Bulgarian regiments have been sent far away: is there any better security than being a friend of the Turks?

STEINHARDT

CSB

767.74

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Articles in YENI SABAH of May 27th and May 28th discussing Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

Information concerning -

767.74/125

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#507
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated May 29, 1942 From / ~~To~~ Turkey Ankara - Steinhardt

File No. 867.9111/445

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

125

PS/FPJ

C/C
NE

HRL

PLAIN

Ankara

Dated May 29, 1942

Rec'd 9:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

507, twenty-ninth.

In two articles in YENI SABAH of twenty-seventh and twenty-eight Yalchin discusses Turkish Bulgarian relations in reply to article in Bulgarian newspaper ZORA of April fourth by General Lukoff who ascribed the differences previaling between Turkey and Bulgaria in the past to the machinations of foreign powers which he admits still continue. This Yalchin says is unfortunately true but it is his opinion that the Bulgarian peoples themselves are directly responsible if a genuine rapprochement has been impossible; Turkey has done nothing whatsoever to estrange the Bulgarian people and even while party to a pact providing for maintenance of status quo in Balkans was always friendly towards Bulgaria and never failed to support and defend her just demands. It is obvious Yalchin declares that were the Bulgarian people really intent on living on friendly terms with Turks they would have effectively checked all the foreign intrigue referred to by

867.9111/445

Note
7-7-74

to by General Lukoff but unfortunately nobody in Bulgaria has yet taken upon himself this task and instead of establishing cordial relations old hostile sentiments are constantly being fanned not by foreigners but by Bulgarians themselves. In this connection Yalchin speaks of the lamentable condition in which the six hundred thousand Turks of Bulgaria are held and enumerates all the vexations and sufferings which they endure from the mere fact of being Turks and Moslems.

Referring to General Lukoff's statement that Bulgaria has no aspirations whatsoever to the Straits which she definitely prefers to see in Turkey's hands rather than in those of any other power and to his assertion that just as Turkey constitutes a guarantee for Bulgaria's safety a friendly Bulgaria is of similar importance to Turkey Yalchin states that he can very well understand that Bulgaria does not wish to see an imperialistic state obtain control of Straits since such a state in order to insure their military safety would doubtless extend the hinterland in manner disadvantageous to Bulgaria. Considered from this viewpoint, he continues, Turkey is the least dangerous neighbor for Bulgaria which could in fact makes Turkey altogether harmless if she seriously endeavored to obtain

Turkey's

Turkey's full friendship; to achieve this however Turkey must be faced with a country entirely friendly in her actions and aware of her real interests: a Bulgaria which has opened her doors to a foreign army can hardly follow a national and independent policy and collaborate freely with Turkey in stemming an invasion in this direction.

STEINHARDT

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN PLAIN

DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION LIAISON
JUL 11 1942
Department of State

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 10 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM Ankara

Dated July 8, 1942

Rec'd. 3:01 a.m., 9th.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 9 1942
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

714, Eighth

Discussing Bulgarian Turkish relations Yalchin in an editorial in YENAH ABAH on sixth writes "a strongly anti-Turkish play entitled Sveta broadcast on all wave lengths closed the Sofia opera season. On the other hand the Bulgarian Government has time and again stressed the cordial sentiments it says it harbors for Turkey. We have no wish to control Bulgarian feelings but why we wonder is such hypocrisy necessary. The Bulgarians have more than once made the complaint that foreign powers are endeavoring to undermine the relations between our two countries. May we now ask whether opera in question was written, staged and broadcast by an Englishman or an American."

STEINHARDT

RR

FILED
JUL 13 1942

767.74/126
767.74
PS/BB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION LIAISON
FEB 10 1943
Department of State

GG PLAIN

FROM Ankara

Dated February 13, 1943

Rec'd 8:21 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 15 1943
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 18 1943
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

278, Thirteenth

Deputy Yalchins editorial in yesterdays YENI SABAH states in summary: "While official Bulgarian quarters and newspapers express sincere and friendly feelings for Turkey we learn from other Bulgarian publications that a double edged danger is being sharpened against everything Turkish. These criminal activities are steadily growing and are beginning to assume serious proportions. It seems likely that we shall be confronted by a fait accompli unless we can make our voice heard. Endeavors on part of Bulgarians to prove that Moslem element in that country is not of Turkish origin may lead to grave consequences. Happily with approaching collapse of Axis Bulgaria's days also are numbered but we shall never forget that even at such a critical moment of her existence Bulgaria could not refrain from manifesting her enmity towards Turkey.

STEINHARDT

RR

767.74/127

FEB 19 1943

FILED

PS/SMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KEM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Ankara

Dated March 17, 1943

Rec'd 11:31 pm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 2 2 1943
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 19 1943
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

493, March 17, 3 pm

Minister of Foreign Affairs told me this morning that an emissary of King Boris had visited him two days ago and had conveyed a message from the King to the Turk Government to the effect that Bulgaria desired to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with Turkey and that in the event of a German defeat the Bulgarian Government was quite capable of coping with communism or disorder in Bulgaria and that the Turk Government need, therefore, have no anxiety with respect to future developments in Bulgaria.

STEINHARDT

LSB

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767.74/128

PS/ES
Confidential File
FILED
MAR 24 1943

DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION LIAISON
APR 5 - 1943
Department of State

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 237 (R-219).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 2 - 1943
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Istanbul, Turkey, March 6, 1943.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1943 MAR 27 AM 10 25
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: Turkey's Peaceful Intentions as a Bulgarian Editor Conceives Them.

Grace for
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1 to NE
25 CSS
AIR MAIL
3/30/43

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to present below an editorial from the Bulgarian newspaper SLOVO of February 25, 1943, which discusses the relations of Turkey with her neighbors and her peaceful intentions generally.

The writer bases his discussion on the recent speech of the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Saradjoglu, and a recent statement by President Ineunu. Since the conference at Adana Bulgaria has been nervous with respect to events which might develop in Turkey or nearby places. The Bulgarian press takes every opportunity to affirm the good relations that exist between Bulgaria and Turkey. The reference made in the editorial to the Pact of Perpetual Friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey is of some interest in view of the way Bulgaria broke her Pact of Perpetual Friendship with Yugoslavia signed on January 24,1937, and broken by Bulgaria in April 1941. The reference to Turkey's attitude toward Russia is also of interest.

The Istanbul paper, JOURNAL D'ORIENT, of March 6, 1943, refers to a meeting of the Bulgaro-Hungarian Society in Budapest on March 3, the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of San Stafano. It is stated that references to Turkey made at this meeting were warmly applauded. Normally there would be no applause for Turkey on this anniversary, for the fact celebrated is the signature of the treaty which freed Bulgaria from Turkey. The applause was probably stimulated by the Bulgarian Office of National Propaganda.

"Bulgaria and Turkey"

by SLOVO.

"The relations between the two countries founded on the Pact of Perpetual Friendship, continue to develop in peace and understanding. They have become

still

767.74/129
APR 6 1943
PS/BMB

still more clear following the speech of the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Saradjoglu, and the proclamation of the President of the Turkish Republic, His Excellency, Mr. Ismet Ineunu, who, among other things, said the following:

"'Never has our nation spent so much for defense as during the last four years. On the other hand, the number of our sons called to the colors has not in any degree decreased. On the one side stand these sacrifices, and on the other the consideration that we do not conceal any secret intention to attack anyone, but maintain an open and firm policy.

"'We ought also to be watchful, ready, and in a position to make the necessary sacrifices. I desire that my fellow countrymen should never forget that if today forty nations are at war, thirty-five of them perhaps did not wish to enter it. My fellow countrymen know that it is not possible to foresee the future and to know clearly what the future holds in store. Therefore, our policy with regard to the world war will in the future also be the following: In the quality of a nation that does not hold any hostile feelings toward any in the family of nations, we desire to live in such a way as to preserve our territory, our rights and our interests.'

"Everyone who knows the geographical and international position of Turkey, does not have the slightest doubt as to the sincerity of the Turkish statesmen. The Achilles heel of Turkish foreign policy has always been its relations with Soviet Russia. And if today, according to the statement of Mr. Ineunu, Turkey is spending enormous sums for armaments, this is due to the danger which eternally threatens her from Russia. In Ankara and Istanbul they follow with lively interest the development of military operations on the Eastern Front. It appears that every success of the Red Army increases the cares and anxiety of the Turkish statesmen.

"Therefore, we too are confident of the peaceful intentions of Turkish policy with regard to ourselves, something in which a Roumanian journalist writing in the newspaper CURENTUL desires us to be confident. This relationship the press of the two nations also ought to maintain. It is desirable that the leaders of the press here as in Turkey should avoid everything which irritates and divides and should look for that which makes for harmony. This

reciprocity

reciprocity on both sides is indispensable, and this is not difficult to achieve if we take into consideration the fact that we live in an epoch of a controlled press."

Respectfully yours,

Burton Y. Berry
American Consul

To Department in original and hectograph.

FHB:sa

Hecto sent to DOA

X

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Policy toward Turkey.

767.74/8-2044

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See ~~1 Aide~~ Memoire
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated August 20, 1944 From / To British Embassy

File No. 740.0011 E.W./8-2044

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767.74/9-1344

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Areas affected by the dismissal of the prefects of Skopplje and the Aegean region and the appointment of others to these posts was a disconcerting move by a government which it was thought was anxious to propitiate the Allies are Yugoslav and Greek territories under Bulgarian occupation.

767.74/9-1344

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#7524,8pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Sept.13,1944 From Great Britain

File No. 874.01/9-1344

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

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